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 1 
 In May 2013, the mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, announced his intention to revise 
the city’s master plan.1 The Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial, or POT for short, had 
undergone minor revisions since it was established in 2000, but nothing on the scale Petro 
had in mind. The City Council initially refused to discuss the proposal, leading Petro to pass 
it by decree. This infuriated his longtime adversaries, who promptly filed suit. A judge 
sympathetic to the opposition suspended the plan, and over a year later it was still hung up in 
court. While various dimensions of the proposal provoked discontent, one proved especially 
incendiary: Petro’s desire to reorganize the master plan around climate change. In the words 
of a critic, though his supporters would agree, the mayor’s goal was to make adaptation “the 
core principle guiding the planning of the city.”2 
Petro began his political career with the leftwing M-19 and spent two years in prison 
before participating in the militant group’s demobilization. Once elected to the House of 
Representatives and eventually the Senate, he became a key opponent of the conservative 
political establishment. Petro made a name for himself as a fiery critic of corruption, 
persistently condemning the intimate relationship between elected politicians, drug 
traffickers, paramilitary forces, and other private interests. As mayor of Bogotá since 2012, 
he has expanded his political horizons: in his first year in office, he became an outspoken 
advocate of the imperative to adapt to the changing climate. This represents a sharp change, 
since until recently Bogotá was considered to be lacking an adaptation strategy.
3
 In contrast, 
Petro’s position has been remarkably unambiguous for a political leader: “Global warming is 
irreversible. The damage is done, and we can’t undo it. It may be possible to slow it down. 
But if we don’t do something now, we’re all dead.”4 
The mayor’s attention to climate change has angered many, especially those who see 
Bogotá’s future through the lens of capital investment, and his revised master plan has been a 
lightning rod for criticism. Though he may not achieve all of his goals, he has clearly raised 
climate change to the top of the political agenda. Despite a cloud of uncertainty hanging over 
City Hall—Petro’s opponents have tirelessly sought to remove him from office—his 
administration has begun to take action. The municipal agency that once specialized in 
disaster prevention and response has been given the broad mandate of climate change 
adaptation. Along with a new title, the District Institute for Risk Management and Climate 
Change (hereafter IDIGER) was promoted within the city’s governance structure and given a 
budget commensurate to its elevated importance. This allowed the agency to begin 
implementing a range of adaptation initiatives: from early warning systems and participatory 
budgeting workshops to bioengineering experiments and watershed management plans. 
Based on recent fieldwork within IDIGER, and building upon long-term research in 
Colombia, this article will examine the new techno-political responsibilities, capabilities, and 
constituencies accompanying these initiatives. It will show how the imperative to adapt to 
climate change actively reconfigures both urban infrastructures and politics in Bogotá.
5
 
In what follows, “adaptive publics” will serve as a way to conceptualize the political 
constituency assembling around the problem of climate change in the city. Bogotá’s recent 
experiments in urban climate governance will be situated within the politics of security in 
late-twentieth-century Colombia, whereby victimhood and vulnerability are both targets of 
governmental intervention and frames of political recognition. These innovative adaptation 
strategies will be shown to challenge notions of the “public” associated with the liberal 
democratic polities of North American and European cities. It will be argued that the politics 
of climate change in Bogotá aims to link a redistributive economic agenda to the technical 
project of adaptation in the service of a broad program of social inclusion. An analysis of 
interventions aimed at building social infrastructure throughout the city’s hydrological 
systems will highlight a form of “metrological citizenship,” whereby the inclusion of the 
urban poor within the political community of the city is predicated on (and enacted through) 
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practices of measurement. While urban politics in Latin America have long revolved around 
popular demands to be counted, this article will show climate change adaptation to be the 
most recent idiom in which claims to recognition-through-enumeration are being articulated. 
However, looking ahead to the future, the political uncertainty plaguing Bogotá’s adaptation 
agenda parallels the ecological uncertainty to which it responds. 
 
From Endangered City to Resilient City 
 
Throughout the 2000s, crime and violence in Bogotá dramatically decreased and 
security steadily improved. Yet there was something paradoxical about this change. Although 
the general atmosphere is now more relaxed, Bogotá remains, to some degree, in the grip of 
Colombia’s violent past. It continues to be understood as an endangered city—that is, as a 
threat-ridden place.
6
 Though immediate dangers have declined, a more general sense of 
endangerment remains. Colombia’s history of conflict, violence, and instability continues to 
orient both popular sentiments and political rationalities towards the ultimate pursuit of 
security. Governmental authority, national unity, and social order are framed primarily in 
these terms. The persistence of everyday concerns about insecurity has many implications. 
One is that democracy and security have been fused such that a number of rights and 
entitlements have been reconfigured by the imperative to protect life from threat (Rojas 2009; 
Zeiderman 2013; cf. Goldstein 2012). Another is that elected officials across the political 
spectrum must position themselves within the national security landscape, such that the 
moderate and radical Left seek to promote their own versions of security in order to prevent 
the Right from monopolizing this key political terrain (Villaveces Izquierdo 2002; Rivas 
Gamboa 2007; Llorente and Rivas 2004).  
The constitutive relationship between politics and security has its parallel in the 
domain of urban politics and government, in the relationship between the state and the urban 
citizen, and in the formation of the city as a political community. Over the past two decades, 
a political consensus—a governing pact—has formed around the imperative to protect 
vulnerable populations from threats of both environmental and human origin.
7
 Risk 
management is accepted across the political spectrum as a governmental framework that can 
encompass a range of objectives. Interventions throughout the urban periphery have focused 
on reducing vulnerability, mitigating risk, and protecting life in order to deal with problems 
as diverse as informality, criminality, and marginality (Zeiderman 2015). In risk 
management, a series of mayoral administrations with varying political commitments and 
different visions for the future of Bogotá have found an ostensibly neutral, “post-political” 
way to address the social and environmental problems of the urban periphery and to build a 
political constituency among the urban poor. This has enabled left-of-center administrations 
to articulate a progressive approach to security that insulates them from the conservative 
establishment’s efforts to criminalize, persecute, or annihilate anything resembling radical 
ideology. The politics of security in late-twentieth-century Colombia have set the parameters 
by which urban life can be governed and lived. 
Responses to climate change in contemporary Bogotá emerge out of this history. For 
it has shaped the terrain on which progressives like Petro now search for a viable political 
idiom in which to govern. Like disaster risk management before it, climate change adaptation 
is a platform from which to address a range of political objectives. Reverberations of longer 
histories of insecurity are also evidenced by the current emphasis on adaptation over 
mitigation.
8
 Organized around categories of “victimhood” and “vulnerability” and the 
identification of threat and danger, security and adaptation share a common logic. The 
concept of “resilience,” now firmly established in the lexicon of government in Bogotá, also 
makes intuitive sense in this context; if “endangerment” indexes the condition of existence 
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whereby threats of human and non-human origin are always looming, then “resilience” 
names the capacity to withstand them or to bounce back after they materialize. There are 
other reasons why adaptation and resilience are favored over mitigation at the present 
moment in Bogotá.
9
 But this orientation is shaped fundamentally by the horizon of security 
and risk that structures politics and governs everyday life in Colombia. The endangered city 
slides easily into the resilient city. 
That said, Petro and members of his administration often defy the 
adaptation/mitigation dichotomy by articulating the dual benefits of any single initiative. In 
scientific and policy discourses, there is a general shift toward recognizing the positive 
feedback loops that link mitigation and adaptation, and in Bogotá new urban policies are 
justified on similar grounds (Bulkeley 2013). Densification of the city center is one example: 
the goal of cutting emissions from motorized transport by moving people closer to their jobs 
is linked to the objective of reducing the number of people living in areas vulnerable to 
environmental hazards on the urban periphery.
10
 In climate change, Petro has found a 
political discourse that can unify a broad range of policies and plans for urban development. 
In 2013, I returned to Bogotá to find out more about this surge in climate change 
politics. A number of people I spoke with discussed Petro’s concern for the risks associated 
with extreme weather events and his support for the relocation of families living in “zones of 
high risk.” Around the same time, he issued a decree ordering 12,000 additional households 
to be resettled over three years. This was a dramatic increase both in the scale of the 
relocation program and in the housing subsidy the municipal government would provide to 
each family (now 45 million pesos, or about $25,000). Petro explained to the media that this 
decision was long overdue. Thanks to inaction on the part of previous administrations, he 
said, “thousands of families have settled in immitigable high-risk zones. Living in a zona de 
alto riesgo means an increased probability of death due to environmental risks…45 million 
[pesos] is the amount required to speed up the process of relocation and completely undo a 
decade of delay in the city of Bogotá.” Petro was clearly committed to expanding the 
resettlement program in the self-built settlements of the urban periphery—to using techniques 
of risk management to respond to the precarious living conditions of those on the margins of 
Colombian society. But I wanted to hear directly from those managing this program how they 
understood City Hall’s new enthusiasm for their work. 
Ulises, the program director, confirmed what I had read in the papers: “The budget for 
relocation has quintupled under Petro! Initially we were in charge of relocating about 3,000 
households annually, but this number has now increased to 15,000.” I then asked Ulises why 
he thought Petro found this program so important. He told me: “As you know, the guiding 
principle behind our work is to save lives. This hasn’t changed. Everything else follows that 
principle. Petro knows that every four months or so we’re hit hard by heavy rains and 
landslides. He’s got that clear. He says time and time again that he doesn’t want to lose a 
single life in the zonas de alto riesgo.” Until this point we were on familiar ground, and I told 
Ulises that each of his predecessors had said the same thing. “But,” he retorted, “Petro 
understands what no previous mayor of Bogotá has: that climate change is absolutely real and 
serious, and that what we’re doing here with the resettlement program could become the 
foundation for a citywide strategy of adaptation.” 
This can be understood as an expansion of established approaches to governing risk in 
Bogotá, whereby what began as a relatively limited experiment is on its way to becoming a 
generalized strategy of urban government. But the escalation of interventions in high-risk 
areas also signals a shift in the way these interventions are framed. What was once a way to 
protect poor and vulnerable populations from regularly occurring disasters has morphed into 
a citywide response to the potentially dire consequences of climate change. The problem is 
no longer the relatively constant periodicity of the rainy season in Colombia and its rather 
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predictable effects in the city’s steep hillside settlements. Petro has recognized that global 
warming will increase the severity and frequency of extreme weather events, thereby 
intensifying pressure on urban infrastructure and housing. The compounded uncertainty 
inherent to climate change means that existing techniques for governing risk in Bogotá are 
necessary but insufficient.
11
 This requires not only expanding the Caja’s resettlement 
program throughout the self-built settlements of the urban periphery but also using this 
program as a guide for how to plan, build, and govern the city as a whole. 
 
Between Victimhood and Vulnerability 
 
I went back to Bogotá in August 2014 to see how the politics of climate change was 
playing out on the ground. My visit coincided with the Rio + 20 Summit, which followed the 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development that had taken place in 2012 in 
Brazil. For three days, Bogotá would play host to high-level dialogues between scientists, 
policymakers, and non-governmental organizations from around the world. The delegates 
were expected to share their knowledge and experience with climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. But the international visitors, who travelled from as far as Egypt and China, were 
allocated a small amount of time relative to their local hosts. Capitalizing on Bogotá’s global 
reputation as a “success story” for its innovations in urban governance, the event’s organizers 
positioned themselves as leaders in the field of climate change adaptation. As such, the 
summit was an opportunity for Petro’s administration to showcase its agenda, perhaps even 
to mobilize international support for the revised master plan, which remained suspended. 
I awoke early to get to the conference venue before the proceedings began. During the 
taxi ride, I noticed something not terribly unusual in Bogotá: a line of over fifty people 
waiting single-file outside a non-descript office building. Five blocks later I passed a similar 
scene, except this time the line stretched down the block and around the corner. I asked the 
taxi driver what was going on. It turned out that each building housed a Centro Dignificar (a 
literal translation is impossible; dignificar means simply “to dignify”). These were centers set 
up after the 2011 passage of the Law of Victims and Land Restitution to house 
representatives of the national and local government agencies responsible for protecting the 
rights of and providing reparations to victims of violence. Since the 1960s, Colombia’s armed 
conflict has caused an inordinate amount of death, destruction, and displacement. Those lined 
up were hoping to register or advance their claims to land restitution. Waiting to be 
recognized as beneficiaries of a state that adjudicates rights on the basis of victimhood, they 
were subjects of what Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman (2009) have called the “empire of 
trauma.” 
I arrived at the summit in time to catch the mayor’s welcome address. His message 
was plain: climate change, as he put it, is “killing the poor.”12 Petro’s speech was also an 
opportunity to take shots at national government’s housing policy. President Juan Manuel 
Santos had recently declared his intention to build 100,000 new homes, mostly on the 
periphery of Colombian cities, and to give them away to members of the urban poor who 
were also victims of armed conflict (a benefit accessed at the centers I had just passed). The 
national government’s housing policy conflicted directly with Petro’s plan for densification. 
The mayor’s goal was to build new housing in the city center for people currently living on 
the edges of the city, especially vulnerable populations at “high risk” for landslide and flood. 
What Petro did not emphasize in his opening remarks was the common ground he and the 
President shared. Despite their disagreement as to where, when, and how new housing should 
be built, both proposals forged a connection between plans for the city and the lives (and 
deaths) of the urban poor. 
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This unremarked congruence reveals the degree to which the politics of security sets 
the conditions of possibility for everything from climate change adaptation to housing policy. 
But there were two important differences between the competing visions. Santos’s plan 
understood the poor as actual victims while Petro’s alternative saw them as potential victims 
(in other words, as vulnerable); and while the former focused on the past threat of armed 
conflict, the latter targeted the future threat of climate change. These distinctions 
notwithstanding, both politicians—despite their professed opposition—emphasized threats to 
life and positioned the victim and the vulnerable as the unassailable moral subjects of 
Colombian politics and as the deserving recipient of the state’s official beneficence. The 
categories of victimhood and vulnerability shape the field of governmental intervention for 
climate change adaptation in Bogotá. 
 
Adaptive Publics 
 
 The rest of the Rio + 20 Summit was a platform for the Petro administration to 
showcase its climate change agenda. Details of that agenda will be discussed shortly. The 
overarching message communicated to the audience was the goal of assembling a political 
constituency through the imperative of adaptation. Everyone I heard speak on stage, everyone 
I talked to face-to-face, seemed to agree: the city government’s guiding mission, and in 
particular that of IDIGER, the newly created risk management and climate change agency, 
was to build a public around the goal of adapting to a decidedly unpredictable and potentially 
violent urban ecological future. 
 That said, the term público did not figure prominently in these discussions. This fact 
should not be overlooked. Better yet, it should be cause to consider some of the problems 
involved in focusing the lens of “publics” on the politics of climate change in Bogotá. A 
critical approach to such concepts is surely necessary when dealing with what postcolonial 
scholars have shown to be societies perpetually divided between those who belong to the 
imagined collectives of liberal democracy and those who do not (Chatterjee 2011; 
Chakrabarty 2000). In Latin American cities, categories like the “citizenry,” the “public,” and 
the “commons” have often competed with other notions of the body politic, and have long 
been internally stratified along lines of race, ethnicity, gender, education, language, sexuality, 
class, and religion (Sabato 2001; de la Cadena 2000). A similar point can be made about the 
linear privatization narratives central to critiques of neoliberalism, and their supposed 
reversal in a “post-neoliberal” era (Yates and Bakker 2013; Bakker 2013). Again, the 
category of “public” often occludes more than it reveals. 
Caution is even more warranted when we recognize that for those on the margins of 
civil society, liberal democratic institutions and ideals are often circumscribed by and 
subordinated to other rationalities of rule (Chatterjee 2004). Many uses of “publics” as an 
analytical frame begin with a rather taken-for-granted notion of democracy. One example 
would be science studies scholars, who sometimes commit this error even as they rethink 
democracy in order to make room for nonhuman things.
13
 For they often fail to engage with 
histories and geographies of “disjunctive democracy,” as Teresa Caldeira and James Holston 
call it, “where the development of citizenship is never cumulative, linear, or evenly 
distributed for all citizens, but is always a mix of progressive and regressive elements, 
uneven, unbalanced, and heterogeneous” (1999:692). Automatically resorting to notions like 
“publics” limits our ability to think through the politics of climate change in decidedly 
illiberal or non-democratic circumstances. This is no doubt the case in places like Colombia, 
where political liberalism has always been contested and incomplete. Perhaps the same 
concern applies even to “advanced” liberal democracies of Europe and North America. 
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 If not in the idiom of “publics,” how is the imperative to create a political 
constituency around climate change adaptation imagined and discussed in Bogotá? More 
prevalent are collective categories such as la gente (the people), la comunidad (the 
community), la población (the population), and lo popular (the popular). These categories are 
often foregrounded in political discourse, pointing to the populist orientation of climate 
change adaptation in Bogotá. If the “public” is invoked, it’s when Petro and other members 
of his party talk about la alianza público-popular (the public-popular alliance). Here the state 
is synonymous with the “public” and the political constituency it seeks to mobilize is the 
“popular.” It’s tempting to understand climate change politics in Bogotá as populist—that is, 
as a politics based on the will of “the people” as the “rightful source of sovereign authority” 
(Samet 2013:526). 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to adopt “publics” as an analytical lens while 
recognizing the potential problems involved in doing so. Central to Petro’s adaptation agenda 
is the goal of addressing a fragmented and somewhat privatized urban infrastructure. For 
example, the city’s water supply, sewage, and drainage systems are run by a public agency, 
but that agency contracts out much of the construction and management of infrastructure to 
private firms, who maintain it unevenly across the city. Starting with drainage (or garbage, 
actually, but that’s another story), Petro wants the city’s vital systems brought back fully 
under public management, or rather into an arrangement whereby the city government 
partners with neighborhood associations (here again, the “public-popular alliance” is 
invoked). Thinking through “publics” highlights the degree to which adaptation in Bogotá 
aims to reorient spaces of urban collective life around the common good. 
This, in turn, directs our attention to questions of rights and citizenship. On many 
occasions in Bogotá (and on Twitter), I encountered the slogan: El cambio climático es un 
hecho, adaptación es un derecho! “Climate change is a fact, adaptation is a right!” What a 
few years ago might have been framed as the “right to the city” is now expressed as the right 
to a city adapted to future (climate) uncertainty. “Citizenship” (in this securitized form) is the 
idiom within which the rights and responsibilities of adaptation are discussed. 
Another reason to conceptualize the politics of climate change in Bogotá through the 
lens of “publics” has to do with the boundaries of political discourse in Colombia. As Robert 
Samet observes, “the term populism has decidedly negative overtones. To call someone a 
‘populist’ is to accuse him or her of pandering to ‘the masses,’ whipping up anti-institutional 
fervor, and using social unrest for personal political gain” (2013:526). “Populist” is a 
damning word in Colombian political discourse regardless of whatever analytical neutrality it 
may have for social scientists, and is automatically how Petro’s opponents characterize his 
initiatives. It immediately draws connections to clientalism, patronage, and corruption, 
delegitimizing its participants as delusional masses irrationally following a charismatic leader 
(cf. Samet 2013). The analytical category of “publics,” on the other hand, is less freighted.  
Finally, “publics” facilitate comparison, not in the sense of searching for equivalence 
but rather thinking across difference. Approaching issues of adaptation in Bogotá through this 
lens offers points of connection with cities elsewhere, both North and South. In the following 
sections, “adaptive publics” refers to the hybrid collectives assembling around the problem of 
climate change adaptation in the city, and the technical and political projects they are 
pursuing, or that are being pursued in their name. I’ll now discuss some of Bogotá’s new 
adaptation initiatives, highlighting the key conceptual and practical issues they present. Each, 
I argue, contributes to the creation of a new political constituency, an “adaptive public.” But 
the public assembled around the problem of climate change, in contrast to the public of 
liberal democratic theory, is predicated on threats to life, stratified by categories of 
vulnerability and victimhood, and summoned by promises of protection. 
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Social Infrastructure 
 
 Since Petro was elected mayor, one of City Hall’s key objectives has been to foster 
“social infrastructure” in the self-built settlements of the urban periphery. Special priority has 
been given to areas adjacent to hydrological features, such as wetlands, canals, rivers, drains, 
and ravines. The stated goal is to reduce concentrated vulnerability among the urban poor by 
strengthening their collective capacity to manage the risks associated with climate change. 
Participación popular, or “popular participation,” is its guiding principle. 
 In late 2013, I attended a launch event for the Red Social de Gestión de Riesgo, or the 
Social Network of Risk Management. The event was held at Bogotá’s main convention 
center and hosted by IDIGER. Present were voluntary associations of all sorts, some of which 
were Juntas de Acción Comunal (the lowest level in the city’s governance structure, hereafter 
Juntas) while others were neighborhood organizations focused on the environment, culture, 
or security. Over a thousand people took part, most of them inhabitants of the self-built 
settlements of Bogotá’s urban periphery. The day began with a general assembly, in which 
IDIGER’s director, Javier Pava, outlined the program. A series of workshops followed on 
themes ranging from participatory risk management and community-based vulnerability 
assessment to grassroots environmental education and bottom-up solid waste reduction. 
Group leaders spoke about organizing in their neighborhoods around issues related to risk, 
working in both partnership with and resistance to IDIGER, and what others could learn from 
their experiences. These were the self-appointed spokespeople for the adaptive public. 
Though they did not speak with one voice—in fact, disagreements arose over how best to 
manage risk and reduce vulnerability—they consistently took a critical but collaborative 
stance relative to the municipal government’s adaptation agenda. 
 The overarching themes of the event were popular participation and auto-gestión 
(self-governance). These values sat in tension with the fact that most of the participants (even 
some children accompanying their parents) were wearing jackets, hats, and bandanas 
emblazoned with IDIGER’s name and logo. However, this did not stop many neighborhood 
leaders from denouncing the city government’s relocation program for households in “zones 
of high risk” or from proposing their own alternatives. Again, the members of the adaptive 
public participating in this event positioned themselves as both belonging to and critical of 
the official adaptation program. Even when disparaging IDIGER, they were applauded 
vigorously by invited participants and government officials alike. As the day progressed and 
strategies were shared, contact information exchanged, and potential collaborations 
discussed, calling this a “social network” of risk management began to make sense. 
Compared to the heavily technocratic approach to governing risk I had seen a few years 
before, the objective of creating a political constituency around climate change—an adaptive 
public—stood out. 
 The Rio + 20 Summit took place nearly a year after this launch. One of my reasons 
for attending the later event was to see whether anything initiated at the earlier one had 
materialized. To find out what had become of the “social network” of risk management, I sat 
down with Priscilla, one of the creators of IDIGER’s Community Initiatives Program. She 
explained to me that the program began in 2012 as “a way to work directly with the 
comunidades de base (grassroots), to encourage participation from the bottom up. The 
objective is to convocarlos a todos (bring together, or summon, everyone) to do something 
about risk.” She told me, “adaptation is impossible without the communities. They can 
organize themselves and make their own decisions, but they also require close 
accompaniment to organize in an adequate—that is, an adaptive—manner.” 
The Community Initiatives team, Priscilla said, supports this approach. It works to 
find synergies between the activities of existing social organizations adjacent to waterways 
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and the broader goal of climate change adaptation. Her team starts by offering training in 
capacity-building before getting into exercises designed to identify threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities. An IDIGER representative eventually discloses a budget set aside for the 
group (somewhere around 200 million pesos, or about $80,000) to conduct remediation 
works. The organization has to contribute about $6,000, but in-kind donations are encouraged 
(use of a meeting room, for example). Throughout the process, IDIGER staff members help 
the group to formulate a plan, allocate the budget, and contract workers—that is, to become 
an adaptive public. 
“What sort of concrete initiatives have been done thus far?,” I asked. Priscilla 
responded: “Since climate change is upon us, we have to make sure the streams and canals 
are in the best possible condition. So we clear out and reforest areas surrounding water 
bodies, working with communities so they don’t go back and put more solid waste or rubble 
into the system.” She then went on to define infrastructure as a socio-technical system: “The 
canal is not just a physical thing—it’s also made up of people, and with a bit of support we 
find that the community organizes around it to monitor the water level, to clear out debris, to 
work together on these sorts of problems but also on others that have less to do with the 
canal, with infrastructure, or with adaptation.” The maxim “people as infrastructure” (Simone 
2004) was implicit. 
Priscilla was describing a process by which the ideas introduced at the 2013 event—
social networks, social infrastructures—were put into practice. Implicit was the fact that 
IDIGER’s training sessions communicated to community groups the need to organize around 
the collective condition of vulnerability and the overarching imperative of climate change 
adaptation. By doing so, these groups could enter into partnerships with municipal 
government, making them subcontractors rather than simply beneficiaries. Responsibility was 
devolved to individuals, households, and communities. Yet it was also through this process 
that people on the margins of society could belong to a political constituency. In return, they 
benefited from a novel form of distribution-via-adaptation, whereby public funds designated 
for climate change responses are put directly in the hands of those at the lowest level of the 
political system and the social order (cf. Ferguson 2015). 
 
Metrological Citizenship 
 
To better understand this process, I accompanied the Community Initiatives team on a 
number of recorridos (tours or rounds). One cold, rainy Saturday morning, we travelled to a 
low-income neighborhood called Nueva Delhi on Bogotá’s far southeastern edge. We were 
greeted by the head of the local Junta, who welcomed everyone with a round of coffee from 
the corner bakery. The purpose of today’s exercise, he announced, was to unite those 
committed to organizing an intervention in the adjacent quebrada (ravine).
14
 He introduced 
Tomás from IDIGER. After providing some background on his agency’s coordinating role 
within the city’s climate change adaptation efforts, Tomás got down to business. He went 
around the room, appointing each person a category of object to measure or count (square 
meters of stream edges to be reinforced, cubic meters of garbage to be removed, number of 
trees to be felled). Once duties were assigned, the group took off on foot. We ascended until 
the sidewalks turned to dirt tracks and the houses gave way to dense thickets of alpine scrub. 
We spent the rest of the day—close to eight hours total—traversing the quebrada 
from top to bottom (see fig. 1). Dropping nearly a thousand feet in elevation, the group 
paused every few minutes to measure an area of erosion, count leaking water supply tubes, or 
register an illegal dumpsite. The team worked tirelessly to construct a systematic inventory, 
which they carefully recorded in their Social Network of Risk Management notebooks. The 
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data gathered would eventually be incorporated within the official adaptation strategy for the 
area and guide the distribution of resources for specific projects. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
These acts of measurement can be understood as acts of citizenship, as the collection 
of data is also the assembly of a certain kind of public. Tomás assigned responsibility to each 
person to count something, and it was through these counts that those counting could 
themselves be counted as members of a political constituency—in this case, one organized 
around the imperative of climate change adaptation. Expanding upon Andrew Barry’s (2011) 
“metrological regimes,” this is an expression of something we might call “metrological 
citizenship,” whereby political recognition and entitlement are predicated on (and enacted 
through) performances of enumeration, quantification, calculation, and measurement (cf. 
Appadurai 2012; Townsend 2015). Barry insists that metrology is not antithetical to politics: 
“Measurement and calculation do not only have anti-political effects” (2011:274). After all, 
being counted as a member of the public is one of the basic procedures of liberal democracy. 
But there is nothing necessarily liberal about the politics of metrology (cf. von Schnitzler 
2008). The constitutive relationship between recognition and measurement in metrological 
regimes (whether liberal or illiberal, democratic or populist) sets the boundaries of the body 
politic and shapes struggles over inclusion and exclusion. 
 
The Quebrada and its Public 
 
During these recorridos, new political ecologies came to life. The groups gathered 
together were united by the quebrada. Their participants were not from the same Junta or 
even the same neighborhood, but from opposite sides of the ravine, from different Juntas, 
from a range of community organizations. Stopping frequently, the group snowballed as it 
descended, doubling in size by the end of the day. The quebrada was assembling a political 
constituency that differed from any that existed before the exercise began.
15
 
Yet hard political work was still to come. Before an intervention could begin, the 
group had to designate one organization legally responsible. Difficult questions arose about 
how best to organize, socially and politically, in order to execute the project: Who speaks on 
behalf of the group? Who is in and who is out? Does the quebrada itself have any say? If not, 
who should adjudicate the rights and resources now attached to it? The gender imbalances 
endemic to neighborhood-level politics in Bogotá were front and center. The Junta leaders 
were predominantly men, whereas the women present mainly represented voluntary, issue-
based organizations. When Gladys, the spokeswoman for an environmental group, challenged 
Don Orlando, the President of the Junta, in his bid for the leadership role, she was told: “Why 
don’t you just participate as an individual, as a citizen, as a member of the community 
adjacent to the quebrada? There’s no need for your whole organization to get involved.” 
Glayds would not be sidelined. Her questioning persisted until the group agreed that Don 
Orlando’s Junta would be named on the paperwork, but all decisions would be made 
collectively and horizontally. 
At the center of these negotiations was the quebrada. Due to its unconventional 
political geography—it conformed neither to an existing jurisdiction nor to an established 
institutional form—the quebraba disrupted customary forms of authority and reconfigured 
familiar territorial arrangements. Without ascribing autonomous, intentional agency to the 
nonhuman world, we can nevertheless say that the quebrada politicized people and place in 
new ways. Its ability to assemble a public was enhanced, of course, by the fact that money 
was involved. But there was an affective dimension to the action the quebrada inspired.  
In some cities, like Medellín, quebradas are spaces of conflict and danger. Separating 
one neighborhood from another, they have often served as battlefields for warring 
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paramilitary groups or drug cartels. Clashes flare up, shootouts go down, and bodies are 
dumped there. People have learned to fear and avoid them. Bogotá’s quebradas have never 
had quite the same stigma, but people still approach them with caution. They are believed to 
shelter drug addicts, thieves, the homeless, and others on the urban margins. 
But as security in urban Colombia has improved, people in the hillside settlements 
abutting quebradas have begun to see these “no-go zones” in a different light. Feeling safe to 
traverse them again—albeit always accompanied and only during daylight hours—residents 
of the urban periphery have started imagining new relationships with the waterways bisecting 
their neighborhoods. They are also attuned to shifts in governmental priorities and the 
openings and opportunities that accompany them. And many have first-hand experience with 
quebradas’ potential to overflow and cause damage if not properly maintained. As a result, 
Bogotá’s quebradas are matters of concern around which a public has begun to assemble.  
Although adaptation is actively reconfiguring the politics of the urban periphery, this 
is not a smooth, fast, or seamless process. After all, when concrete entitlements are at stake, 
metrological politics often involves contentious debates over who and what should be 
counted. The adaptive public is heterogeneous and fragmented. There are tensions between 
competing metrics—disputes over how, when, and where measurements should be done. On 
one survey, some participants fixated on recently built shacks perched on the edge of the 
ravine. They marked down the location of the shacks, noted that they were discharging 
sewage directly into the stream, and began to inquire about their occupants, who were 
identified as recent arrivals of modest means and unknown pedigrees. Implied was the need 
to relocate, or perhaps evict, them. A faction within the group objected on the grounds that 
they should be consulted, not displaced. Ultimately, these households were counted, but as 
part of the problem rather than as part of the political constituency empower to solve it. The 
politics of metrology can assemble a participatory, democratic public; it can also slide in the 
direction of illiberal, vigilante justice. 
 
Early Warnings 
 
Metrological citizenship was deepened during IDIGER workshops in which residents 
were trained to participate in the city’s early warning systems. These workshops began with a 
conceptual discussion of the verb prevenir, which combines elements of anticipation, 
foresight, warning, and prevention. They quickly got technical, covering rainfall meters, 
stream flow gauges, river level sensors, and weather monitoring stations. The immediate 
objective was to educate neighborhood groups on the city’s meteorological instruments, and 
how their measurements are communicated via text message. Using examples, the trainers 
focused on how to interpret these alerts, when to take them seriously, and how to warn others. 
The ultimate goal was to strengthen collective resilience by making those living alongside 
waterways integral to the function of the city’s early warning system. At stake were issues of 
vulnerability and responsibility, both central to the formation of an adaptive public. 
Álvaro, an IDIGER technician, instructed the group: “You have to learn how to read 
these alerts and know when they require serious action on your part…we’re not going to tell 
you that.” He gave an example: “You know that it’s been raining heavily for the past few 
weeks and that the quebradas are filling up with garbage and rubble, so you can assume that 
there’s a risk of flooding. It could be a quick, heavy rain (5 millimeters over 10 minutes) or a 
slow, light one (10 millimeters over 3 hours), but since you know the quebrada, you know 
both are potentially problematic.” After this lesson in vulnerability, Álvaro moved to 
responsibility: “This is when you have to alert others in the community and start taking 
preventive measures. We’re not always going to be able to come and save you. Every citizen 
of Bogotá has to do his part.”  
 11 
Like the practices of enumeration discussed above, these measurements belong to the 
domain of political metrology. Fluency in the technical idiom of early warning systems is 
necessary for establishing one’s level of vulnerability and knowing how to act accordingly. 
These are membership criteria for belonging to the public assembled around climate change 
adaptation. When rights and responsibilities are predicated on such information, entitlements 
depend on proficiency in meteorological measurement and monitoring. 
Equipped with such data and the ability to interpret it, residents are presumed by 
IDIGER to share the responsibility of preparing for or responding to emergencies. 
Incorporating people into the function of the early warning system recognized the importance 
of intuitive, non-calculative knowledge for the anticipation of threat and the management of 
infrastructure. But this also enables them to make demands on or wage critiques of the 
government, for the data can be used to hold authorities accountable for actual or potential 
climatic events. Metrological citizenship implies the ability to mobilize measurements in 
order to call for the construction or repair of infrastructure in preparation for the next storm. 
It involves pushing to be recognized as vulnerable in order to access the opportunities made 
available by adaptation. 
Much of what we know about enumeration and urban politics comes from 
commentary on the benefits and dangers of “smart cities” in the global North (Kitchin 2014; 
Greenfield 2013). Intelligent technologies, infrastructures, and buildings are seen to require a 
population willing to relinquish ownership of sensitive personal information and to acquiesce 
to behaviors and values embedded with the design of the devices themselves. Individual 
privacy and freedom are opposed to government surveillance and corporate control. When 
city dwellers enter the equation, it is as “hackers” or “citizen scientists” independently 
collecting data to demand public or private accountability (Townsend 2015). These analyses 
sit in tension with the politics of metrology in Latin America, where urbanization and 
democratization have long depended on popular demands to be counted by the state. For 
inhabitants of the informal, self-built settlements of the urban periphery, political 
incorporation has been predicated on enumeration and measurement. By demanding inclusion 
in official surveys, maps, and plans, and eventually street addresses, bus routes, and land 
titles, they have fought to join the political community of the city. 
In Bogotá, climate change adaptation is the most recent idiom in which claims to 
recognition-through-enumeration are being articulated. In the 1970s and 80s, inclusion was 
sought in terms of development, modernization, legalization, and formalization. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, imperatives such as security, sustainability, and disaster risk management took 
center stage. With the rise of climate change politics, struggles for urban citizenship now 
mobilize metrics associated with adaptation, vulnerability, and resilience. 
 
Budgeting Adaptation 
 
 With trainings completed, inventories conducted, and agreements signed, the 
allocation of resources could begin. This is where the data collected during the surveys 
described above would begin to guide the distribution of funds for specific interventions. To 
this end, IDIGER organized participatory budgeting workshops in community meeting 
houses throughout neighborhoods adjacent to quebradas. One took place in a single-room 
storefront with a roll-up metal door. Since the interior space was too limited for the forty-odd 
attendees, plastic chairs spilled out onto the sidewalk. 
 Equipped with laptop and projector, two IDIGER representatives, Álvaro and Camila, 
introduced the exercise. A spreadsheet prepared specially for the workshop was beamed onto 
a blank white wall. The spreadsheet contained a column of key roles, such as “general 
coordinator” and “accountant,” and one of sample interventions: pruning bushes, fixing 
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stream margins, extracting fallen trees, fixing plumbing leakages, and so on. Further down 
the list were cultural and educational activities, such as inauguration and closing celebrations, 
outreach events, and mural painting workdays. Álvaro explained: “The question is: Which 
risks do you want to invest in mitigating, and which are most likely to cause problems in the 
future?” He then encouraged the group by predicting that they would be more careful and 
effective with their intervention than a hired contractor. “This is why City Hall wants to work 
directly with you,” he stressed. “If we start from your ideas, adaptation is more likely to 
succeed. The best way to reduce vulnerability is by building knowledge and then converting 
it into practice.” 
 Guided by Álvaro, the group traversed the spreadsheet cell by cell. Consulting the 
inventories recorded during their surveys, they called out measurements of the amount of 
work needed in each category. Estimated costs for each line item were tallied automatically. 
As totals accumulated at the bottom of the spreadsheet, the exercise took on a more serious 
tone. Álvaro then unveiled the overall budget: “We have allocated 214,790,014 pesos (about 
$80,000) for this quebrada.” The adaptive public assembled now had to decide on the 
specific interventions on which these funds would be spent.  
But the group also had to agree who among them was going to be hired to perform the 
work. Tensions flared between those who spoke in the name of redistribution and those 
concerned about issues of accountability. Some argued that everyone present should get their 
fare share. A few expressed concern about the Junta leadership distributing funds in exchange 
for political loyalty. Others wanted assurances that the work would truly get done. Álvaro 
finally intervened: “There will be full transparency and zero corruption.” Using a term that 
means to regulate, inspect, control, and supervise all at once, he said: “You can be sure that 
we are going to fiscalizar.” 
In the truck on the way back to IDIGER headquarters, Álvaro and Camila elaborated 
this point with candor. They told me that these initiatives, which are still in their infancy, will 
undoubtedly be barraged by allegations of populism, clientalism, and corruption. Camila 
foresaw members of the opposition demanding investigations by the Contraloría, Colombia’s 
Government Accountability Office. But, Álvaro stressed, “there are just as many if not more 
thieves in private companies with government contracts than among the community. Better to 
put a small amount of resources in the hands of people whose lives are effected by the 
problem,” he says, “than to put a large sum in the pockets of contractors who have no stake in 
it whatsoever.” Regulating the process was necessary not only to ensure results, but also to 
buffer adaptation initiatives from the opposition’s attempts to undo them. 
Among those present, an irony was lost on no one: it was Petro himself, as Senator, 
who scrutinized and eventually uncovered extensive corruption in the city government. His 
predecessor, Samuel Moreno, was ultimately jailed for his illegal relationships and backroom 
deals with private contractors. By increasing public awareness of corruption, Petro was partly 
responsible for creating the climate of suspicion that now surrounded his administration. This 
adds another dimension to the politics of vulnerability in Bogotá. Petro’s adaptation 
initiatives are organized around the imperative to protect vulnerable lives, but are themselves 
vulnerable to being overturned by his political opponents. 
 
An Uncertain Future 
 
Bogotá is clearly the site of an innovative climate change adaptation agenda. But that 
agenda faces serious challenges as it moves forward. The vision for the future of Bogotá 
expressed by Petro’s administration foregrounds adaptation within nearly all sectors of urban 
governance, planning, and development: from densification of the city center and alternative 
transportation networks to social housing schemes and water management systems. It does so 
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not only to prepare the city for a future of ecological uncertainty, but also to transform the 
institutional structures that will lead to a more resilient Bogotá. As Daniel, a top-level 
IDIGER coordinator, explained, “resilience” for Petro is “a new paradigm of governance that 
strengthens public instructions, reduces the influence of the private sector, and challenges the 
tyranny of the market.” This upends academic critiques that treat resilience and neoliberalism 
as homologous (Walker and Cooper 2011). Here the logic is reversed: resilience is used to 
confront neoliberalism and the paradigm of market order on which it rests.
16
 Whether Petro 
succeeds is another matter. What’s significant is that, in Bogotá,  resilience is linked to a 
broad program of social inclusion that seeks to bring essential urban services under public 
management and to redistribute resources to the urban poor (cf. Ferguson 2010). This is not 
to say that adaptation is simply a means to a different end—a social agenda in an ecological 
disguise—but that we must pay attention to what it comes to mean and do at specific 
conjunctures. Indeed, adaptation can be harnessed to a program of socio-environmental 
change that refuses such dichotomies altogether. 
What this emerging politics of climate change will ultimately mean for Bogotá 
depends on whether the broader political program underpinning it will have longevity. The 
adaptation initiatives discussed above may be ephemeral if Petro’s administration is blocked 
from implementing its revised master plan or its ability to govern is further compromised by 
legal battles in the courts and political skirmishes with the City Council. Would it all 
disappear into thin air if Petro were to be permanently removed from office or to lose the next 
election? The political future of these adaptation initiatives is as uncertain as the ecological 
future they confront.  
However, the fact that the politics of disaster risk management of the 1990s and 2000s 
enjoyed relative stability under a handful of different mayors, even some with quite different 
approaches to governing the city, suggests that something similar could be expected here. 
This seems all the more likely if we consider the historical conjuncture in which the politics 
of adaptation has taken root in Bogotá. Whether in the hands of Petro or a successor, climate 
change will remain a strategic way of governing the urban poor and building a political 
constituency that responds both to international pressures and priorities and to the politics of 
security on a national level. 
Even if these adaptation initiatives are soon disavowed or discarded, they nevertheless 
offer an important lesson about contemporary climate politics. In recent years, philosophers 
and social theorists have declared the arrival of two new periods: the “post-political” and the 
“anthropocene.” Some have argued that they are interconnected, and that climate change is 
one of the key domains in which the post-political condition is produced and sustained 
(Swyngedouw 2010). It is easy to find evidence to support this argument. However, we must 
not foreclose the possibility that another climate politics is possible—one that identifies 
strategies for radically reconfiguring the unequal social and economic relations underpinning 
the ecological crisis confronting the present.
17
  
The politics of adaptation in Bogotá has such potential. There are currents of thought 
within it that seek to respond to the dire consequences of climate change with ambitious and 
transformative strategies of social transformation, for example: reducing entrenched 
marginality and widespread economic inequality, strengthening social infrastructure and 
collective resilience among vulnerable communities, opening spaces of political debate and 
participation for previously excluded sectors of society, making vital infrastructures work in 
the interest of people rather than profit, and promoting democratic values of transparency, 
justice, and accountability. While powerful forces seek to derail these initiatives, what is 
perhaps more difficult to suppress is the potential for the adaptation agenda in Bogotá to 
stimulate progressive climate politics elsewhere. 
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Figure 1: A quebrada cutting through a hillside on Bogotá’s southern periphery. Photograph 
by author, 2013. 
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Endnotes 
                                                        
I am grateful to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for supporting this collaboration and to 
LSE Cities for facilitating it. My thanks go especially to Eric Klinenberg for inviting me to 
participate and for his editorial guidance. Nikhil Anand, Göçke Günel, Andrew Lakoff, 
Robert Samet, Jerome Whitington, and two anonymous reviewers generously commented on 
the article or the ideas within it. An earlier version was presented at the Institute for Public 
Knowledge, New York University, where I received invaluable feedback. In Bogotá, my 
gratitude goes to Laura Astrid Ramírez for her research assistance and to Juan David Ojeda 
and Andrés Romero for allowing me to accompany them in their work. Without Germán 
Durán’s logistical help, Bogotá’s quebradas would have been inaccessible. The names of 
those quoted in the text were changed to protect their anonymity and all translations from the 
Spanish are my own. 
1
 The Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT) is the set of rules and regulations that 
determines much of what can and cannot be done within the municipal boundaries. At least in 
theory, the POT designates areas in which the city can expand, identifies zones to be 
protected, dictates the relationship between the city and the surrounding region, controls the 
use of land by different sectors, and establishes guidelines for public transportation, parks, 
utilities, schools, and hospitals. 
2
 Eduardo Behrentz, “Concejo debe hundir el POT,” El Tiempo, May 28, 2013. 
3
 For a review of climate change adaptation and mitigation policies before Petro took office, 
see Lampis (2013a). 
4
 Gustavo Petro, Address at the Bogotá Summit on “Cities and Climate Change,” November 
2012. 
5
 Over a twenty-month period from August 2008 to April 2010, I conducted both 
ethnographic and archival research in Bogotá on the politics of security and the government 
of risk. My specific focus was the field of disaster risk management; in particular, a 
municipal government program working to relocate households from what in the early 2000s 
had been designated zonas de alto riesgo, or “zones of high risk.” I returned for follow-up 
visits of between one and two months in January 2012, December 2013, and August 2014. 
My objective during these visits was to understand how techniques of disaster risk 
management had since merged with the imperative of climate change adaptation. All 
informants’ names have been changed to protect their anonymity. 
6
 Further elaboration on the concept of “endangerment” and on the relationship between 
histories of security in Colombia and contemporary urban politics and government in Bogotá 
can be found in my book, Endangered City: The Politics of Security and Risk in Bogotá 
(forthcoming, Duke University Press). 
7
 There is academic and political debate in Colombia over the right definition and 
measurement of “vulnerability” (see Lampis 2013b for a review of these debates in the 
context of climate change adaptation). 
8
 It is important to note that, before Petro took office, climate change policy on the national 
and municipal levels was focused almost exclusively on mitigation (Lampis 2013a). 
9
 Scientific consensus around the irreversibility of climate change is one reason governments 
cite for emphasizing adaptation over mitigation. Another is the moral argument that 
mitigation should be the responsibility of the largest contributors to greenhouse gas 
emissions. Economic justifications also support the decision to spend limited resources on 
initiatives that will save lives or prevent disasters at home rather than those that will help the 
planet as a whole. The political expediency of adaptation over mitigation is always an 
important factor. For a broader review of these issues, see Wamsler (2014). 
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10
 Various mitigation goals have also been announced recently, such as the progressive 
reduction of carbon emissions by 2020, 2038, and 2050 and the intention to increase the 
amount of the city’s energy supply from alternative sources to 25 percent over the next 35 
years. “Bogotá fija metas para reducir 20% de emisiones de carbono, al 2020,” El Tiempo, 
March 25, 2013. 
11
 There is not space here to comment on the distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty” or 
on the claim that there has been a global shift from the former to the latter in the domain of 
urban and environmental governance. These are topics I have analyzed extensively 
elsewhere. 
12
 “Se instaló e inauguró cumbre Río+20 en Bogotá,” Caracol Radio, August 10, 2014. 
13
 Bruce Braun and Sarah Whatmore note that science studies scholars could benefit from 
greater precision in their political analyses: “citizenship, democracy, representation, and 
politics are constantly invoked in [the STS] literature,” they argue, “[yet] it is not always 
clear to what these terms refer, which traditions in political theory inform them, or where 
these traditions might need revision” (2010:xiv). Noortje Marres’s (2012) work is an example 
of recent attempts to deepen the exchange between STS and political theory by inquiring 
further into the role of materiality in politics and democracy. 
14
 Quebradas are essentially “ravines,” but due to Bogotá’s rainfall patterns they are rarely (if 
ever) dry. Since the local usage of the term implies a waterbody as much as a landform, I will 
mostly retain the Spanish name. 
15
 Recent work in science and technology studies is helpful for understanding such processes. 
In the introduction to a particularly generative set of articles, Marres and Lezaun outline an 
approach to the study of politics that “queries how objects, devices, settings and materials, 
not just subjects, acquire explicit political capacities, capacities that are themselves the object 
of public struggle and contestation, and serve to enact distinctive ideals of citizenship and 
participation” (2011:491). 
16
 A similar point has been made by Stephen J. Collier and Andrew Lakoff (2014) in their 
genealogy of “vital systems security.” They, too, suggest an alternative view of the 
emergence of “resilience” and its political implications relative to neoliberalism. 
17
 Matthew Gandy has observed that the “politics of inevitability” associated with the rise of 
neoliberalism today looks less predetermined: “A more polarized landscape is emerging in 
which some cities have successfully won control back from underperforming private-sector 
providers and even developed new models of public participation in technological politics” 
(2014:16). 
 
